Testimonio y virtudes intelectuales en la epistemología de hume.

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In this paper, I consider some issues concerning Hume’s epistemology of testimony. I’ll particularly focus on the accusation of reductivism and individualism brought by scholars against Hume’s view on testimonial evidence, based on the tenth section of his An enquiry concerning human understanding. I first explain the arguments against Hume’s position, and address some replies in the literature in order to offer an alternative interpretation concerning the way such a defense should go. My strategy is closely connected with Hume’s notion of virtue and the role it plays in his epistemology, mainly as presented in his A treatise of human nature. I address the problem of how the section “Of miracles” in the Enquiry must be properly understood, as several misunderstandings of Hume’s epistemology of testimony emerge partially from the particular character and aim of that section.

Título traducido de la contribuciónTestimony and intellectual virtues in hume’s epistemology
Idioma originalEspañol
Páginas (desde-hasta)29-46
Número de páginas18
EstadoPublicada - 1 oct. 2019

Palabras clave

  • David Hume
  • Epistemology
  • Miracles
  • Testimony
  • Virtue

Áreas temáticas de ASJC Scopus

  • Filosofía


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