Self-selection in the market of teachers

Juan A. Correa, Francisco Parro, Loreto Reyes

Resultado de la investigación: Contribución a una revistaArtículorevisión exhaustiva

4 Citas (Scopus)

Resumen

Public school teachers are usually paid according to centralized earning schedules, in which their income depends mainly on experience. By contrast, in private schools, there is high wage dispersion, and salaries correspond mainly to teachers’ performance. That dichotomous labour regulation encourages teachers with better unobservable skills to self-select into private schools because the likelihood of earning higher wages is higher than in public schools. The other side of the coin is the self-selection of ‘bad’ teachers into public schools. Using a representative sample of Chilean teachers, we estimate a two-sector Roy model to test self-selection. We find evidence of negative self-selection of teachers into public schools.

Idioma originalInglés
Páginas (desde-hasta)1331-1349
Número de páginas19
PublicaciónApplied Economics
Volumen47
N.º13
DOI
EstadoPublicada - 16 mar 2015

Áreas temáticas de ASJC Scopus

  • Economía y econometría

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