TY - JOUR
T1 - Rank effect in bureaucrat recruitment
AU - Guastavino, Carlos
AU - Miranda, Alvaro
AU - Montero, Rodrigo
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 Elsevier B.V.
Copyright:
Copyright 2021 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2021
Y1 - 2021
N2 - Bureaucrats are a crucial part of states, but only recently has a pioneer literature focused on the determinants of their recruitment. In this article, we study the role of rank in bureaucratic selection in the context of the Chilean civil service, where a decision maker (the President or agency director) chooses a candidate from a shortlist ranked according to a final interview score. Using a regression discontinuity design, we document that first-place candidates have a large advantage in the probability of being selected for top positions in the public sector relative to those in second place. In contrast, all other ranks seem to be irrelevant. Our results are robust to the use of several methods of estimation that take into account the discrete nature of the running variable. Moreover, the effect is associated with a selection process with low levels of competition and low-quality final candidates.
AB - Bureaucrats are a crucial part of states, but only recently has a pioneer literature focused on the determinants of their recruitment. In this article, we study the role of rank in bureaucratic selection in the context of the Chilean civil service, where a decision maker (the President or agency director) chooses a candidate from a shortlist ranked according to a final interview score. Using a regression discontinuity design, we document that first-place candidates have a large advantage in the probability of being selected for top positions in the public sector relative to those in second place. In contrast, all other ranks seem to be irrelevant. Our results are robust to the use of several methods of estimation that take into account the discrete nature of the running variable. Moreover, the effect is associated with a selection process with low levels of competition and low-quality final candidates.
KW - Bureaucrats
KW - Civil service system
KW - Rank effect
KW - Regression discontinuity
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85099636215&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2020.101995
DO - 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2020.101995
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85099636215
SN - 0176-2680
VL - 68
JO - European Journal of Political Economy
JF - European Journal of Political Economy
M1 - 101995
ER -