Misreporting, Optimal Incentives, and Auditing

Gino Loyola, Yolanda Portilla

Resultado de la investigación: Article

Resumen

We propose a model that rationalizes the adoption of a misreporting system allowing managerial earning manipulation. A key element of our approach is the possibility of a tacit collusion between the board and the top management at the expense of shareholders and outside investors. Our framework predicts that the adoption of a misreporting system is mainly related to (i) the cost to the management of implementing such a system, (ii) the level of incentives and punishment the board faces, and (iii) the degree of independence/integrity of external auditors.

Idioma originalEnglish
PublicaciónInternational Review of Finance
Volumen18
N.º2
DOI
EstadoPublished - jun 2018

Huella dactilar

Incentives
Misreporting
Auditing
Investors
Earnings manipulation
Costs
External auditor
Shareholders
Punishment
Integrity
Expenses
Top management
Tacit collusion

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Citar esto

Loyola, Gino ; Portilla, Yolanda. / Misreporting, Optimal Incentives, and Auditing. En: International Review of Finance. 2018 ; Vol. 18, N.º 2.
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Misreporting, Optimal Incentives, and Auditing. / Loyola, Gino; Portilla, Yolanda.

En: International Review of Finance, Vol. 18, N.º 2, 06.2018.

Resultado de la investigación: Article

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