Falacia naturalista y razón teorética. Una aproximación sistemática al problema del "deber ser" en David Hume

Resultado de la investigación: Contribución a una revistaArtículorevisión exhaustiva

Resumen

This article explores a refreshing interpretation of the "isought- pasage" in Hume's third book of the Treatise. Such interpretation heavily relies on pondering the consequences that the argument would imply for Hume's epistemology. Indeed, the traditional interpretation of the passage involves relevant inconsistencies both in Hume's practical and theoretical philosophy, since at both stages it becomes necessary to account for Hume's normative claims and their importance. The interpretation advanced in this writing supports the idea that the "is-ought passage" is far from denying the possibility of deriving normative claims from facts, but rather that it sets constrains on the way in which such derivation is conceivable.

Título traducido de la contribuciónNaturalistic fllacy and theoretical reason. a systematic approach to the problem of normativity in Hume's thought
Idioma originalEspañol
Páginas (desde-hasta)181-212
Número de páginas32
PublicaciónRevista de Humanidades
Volumen33
EstadoPublicada - 2016

Palabras clave

  • Epistemology
  • General rules
  • Hume
  • Is-ought
  • Naturalistic fallacy

Áreas temáticas de ASJC Scopus

  • Arte y humanidades (todo)

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