Falacia naturalista y razón teorética. Una aproximación sistemática al problema del "deber ser" en David Hume

Resultado de la investigación: Article

Resumen

This article explores a refreshing interpretation of the "isought- pasage" in Hume's third book of the Treatise. Such interpretation heavily relies on pondering the consequences that the argument would imply for Hume's epistemology. Indeed, the traditional interpretation of the passage involves relevant inconsistencies both in Hume's practical and theoretical philosophy, since at both stages it becomes necessary to account for Hume's normative claims and their importance. The interpretation advanced in this writing supports the idea that the "is-ought passage" is far from denying the possibility of deriving normative claims from facts, but rather that it sets constrains on the way in which such derivation is conceivable.

Idioma originalSpanish
Páginas (desde-hasta)181-212
Número de páginas32
PublicaciónRevista de Humanidades
Volumen33
EstadoPublished - 2016

Huella dactilar

Normativity
Theoretical Reason
Thought
Epistemology
Inconsistency
Treatise
Philosophy

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Arts and Humanities(all)

Citar esto

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title = "Falacia naturalista y raz{\'o}n teor{\'e}tica. Una aproximaci{\'o}n sistem{\'a}tica al problema del {"}deber ser{"} en David Hume",
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year = "2016",
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volume = "33",
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journal = "Revista de Humanidades",
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AU - Espinosa, Ruth Marcela

PY - 2016

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N2 - This article explores a refreshing interpretation of the "isought- pasage" in Hume's third book of the Treatise. Such interpretation heavily relies on pondering the consequences that the argument would imply for Hume's epistemology. Indeed, the traditional interpretation of the passage involves relevant inconsistencies both in Hume's practical and theoretical philosophy, since at both stages it becomes necessary to account for Hume's normative claims and their importance. The interpretation advanced in this writing supports the idea that the "is-ought passage" is far from denying the possibility of deriving normative claims from facts, but rather that it sets constrains on the way in which such derivation is conceivable.

AB - This article explores a refreshing interpretation of the "isought- pasage" in Hume's third book of the Treatise. Such interpretation heavily relies on pondering the consequences that the argument would imply for Hume's epistemology. Indeed, the traditional interpretation of the passage involves relevant inconsistencies both in Hume's practical and theoretical philosophy, since at both stages it becomes necessary to account for Hume's normative claims and their importance. The interpretation advanced in this writing supports the idea that the "is-ought passage" is far from denying the possibility of deriving normative claims from facts, but rather that it sets constrains on the way in which such derivation is conceivable.

KW - Epistemology

KW - General rules

KW - Hume

KW - Is-ought

KW - Naturalistic fallacy

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EP - 212

JO - Revista de Humanidades

JF - Revista de Humanidades

SN - 0717-0491

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