A Bargaining Model of Friendly and Hostile Takeovers

Gino Loyola, Yolanda Portilla

Resultado de la investigación: Contribución a una revistaArtículorevisión exhaustiva

1 Cita (Scopus)

Resumen

A bargaining model is developed that characterizes the conditions under which a takeover will either be friendly, hostile, or unsuccessful when the target management can tilt the selling procedure toward a white knight. The conditions considered mainly involve private control benefits, toehold size, and breakup fees. Also established by the model are the conditions for an efficient takeover. The proposed framework of strong management influence on takeover outcome, an alternative modeling of hostility and the adoption of a negotiation procedure, rather than an auction setup with strong shareholder influence as in most of the existing literature, delivers new insights into the US market of corporate control, which are consistent with the available evidence.

Idioma originalInglés
Páginas (desde-hasta)291-306
Número de páginas16
PublicaciónInternational Review of Finance
Volumen16
N.º2
DOI
EstadoPublicada - 1 jun 2016

Áreas temáticas de ASJC Scopus

  • Finanzas
  • Economía y econometría

Huella

Profundice en los temas de investigación de 'A Bargaining Model of Friendly and Hostile Takeovers'. En conjunto forman una huella única.

Citar esto