TY - CHAP
T1 - When Risk Management Systems ‘Fail’
T2 - On Criminal Negligence and the Limits of Scientists’ Responsibility
AU - Perin, Andrea
N1 - Funding Information:
The author would like to thank Ilaria Campagna (PhD, University of Trento) for her insightful and helpful comments. The author also gratefully acknowledges the suggestions of Gabriele Fornasari (Full Professor of Criminal Law, University of Trento) and D?nal O?Math?na (co-editor).
Publisher Copyright:
© 2019, Springer Nature Switzerland AG.
Copyright:
Copyright 2020 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2019
Y1 - 2019
N2 - This chapter consists of a brief discussion on some legal aspects concerning scientists’ responsibility in risk prevention processes. After proposing some introductory considerations on scientists’ responsibility as such, the author deals with the L’Aquila earthquake crisis of 2009, when a strong quake destroyed significant parts of L’Aquila (Italy) and surrounding villages, killing more than 300 people. The chapter focuses on the relations between scientific knowledge, normative expectations, decision-making and criminal negligence for ‘failed’ risk assessment and management, paying particular attention to the role of ‘regulatory science’ in constructing the ‘reasonable person’ normative standard of care in the theory of criminal negligence. This allows explaining why the first judgement in the L’Aquila trial (2012) is not convincing, having misunderstood how policy-relevant science should participate in prevention processes and the construction of normative standards. In his conclusions, the author suggests some reasons for the recent tendency to blame experts when natural or technological disasters occur.
AB - This chapter consists of a brief discussion on some legal aspects concerning scientists’ responsibility in risk prevention processes. After proposing some introductory considerations on scientists’ responsibility as such, the author deals with the L’Aquila earthquake crisis of 2009, when a strong quake destroyed significant parts of L’Aquila (Italy) and surrounding villages, killing more than 300 people. The chapter focuses on the relations between scientific knowledge, normative expectations, decision-making and criminal negligence for ‘failed’ risk assessment and management, paying particular attention to the role of ‘regulatory science’ in constructing the ‘reasonable person’ normative standard of care in the theory of criminal negligence. This allows explaining why the first judgement in the L’Aquila trial (2012) is not convincing, having misunderstood how policy-relevant science should participate in prevention processes and the construction of normative standards. In his conclusions, the author suggests some reasons for the recent tendency to blame experts when natural or technological disasters occur.
KW - Criminal negligence
KW - L’Aquila case
KW - Normative expectations
KW - Precautionary principle
KW - Reasonable person
KW - Regulatory science
KW - Risk management
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85092066057&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-030-11977-5_17
DO - 10.1007/978-3-030-11977-5_17
M3 - Chapter
AN - SCOPUS:85092066057
T3 - International Library of Ethics, Law and Technology
SP - 211
EP - 225
BT - International Library of Ethics, Law and Technology
PB - Springer Science and Business Media B.V.
ER -