Testimonio y virtudes intelectuales en la epistemología de hume.

Translated title of the contribution: Testimony and intellectual virtues in hume’s epistemology

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


In this paper, I consider some issues concerning Hume’s epistemology of testimony. I’ll particularly focus on the accusation of reductivism and individualism brought by scholars against Hume’s view on testimonial evidence, based on the tenth section of his An enquiry concerning human understanding. I first explain the arguments against Hume’s position, and address some replies in the literature in order to offer an alternative interpretation concerning the way such a defense should go. My strategy is closely connected with Hume’s notion of virtue and the role it plays in his epistemology, mainly as presented in his A treatise of human nature. I address the problem of how the section “Of miracles” in the Enquiry must be properly understood, as several misunderstandings of Hume’s epistemology of testimony emerge partially from the particular character and aim of that section.

Translated title of the contributionTestimony and intellectual virtues in hume’s epistemology
Original languageSpanish
Pages (from-to)29-46
Number of pages18
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - 1 Oct 2019

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy


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