Private vs. public communication: Difference of opinion and reputational concerns

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Abstract

This paper studies the cost and benefits of private and public communication in a game with a policy maker, a privately-informed expert, and the public. The policy maker and the expert have different opinions/views about the state of the world and both the expert and policy maker care about the expert's reputation with the public. The amount of information acquisition and transmission under private vs. public communication, depends on how much the policy maker and the expert differ in opinion. If both have either moderate or very extreme opinions, the costs and benefits are the same. In contrast, when the policy maker is moderate and the expert has more extreme opinions, private communication is better, while if the policy maker is extreme and the expert has moderate views, public communication is better.

Original languageEnglish
Article number105314
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume196
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sept 2021

Keywords

  • Accountability
  • Experts
  • Non-common priors
  • Private and public communication
  • Reputation
  • Transparency

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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