La posición de John Stuart Mill en relación al problema de Hume: La justificación de la inferencia inductiva y la naturaleza del principio de inducción

Translated title of the contribution: John Stuart Mill's view on Hume's problem: The justification of inductive inference and the nature of the principle of induction

Ana Pía León Miranda

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

The article aims to analyze and reconstruct John Stuart Mill's position on the problem of induction. We show that Mill despite being aware of Hume's objections, does not refer to them mainly because for him the justification of induction is possible. The main hypothesis will be proved by two theses: The first, refers to the avoidance of circular reasoning on the justification of inductive inference; and the second, refers to the type of inductions supporting the principle of regularity: Inductions by simple enumeration.

Translated title of the contributionJohn Stuart Mill's view on Hume's problem: The justification of inductive inference and the nature of the principle of induction
Original languageSpanish
Pages (from-to)35-51
Number of pages17
JournalDiscusiones Filosoficas
Volume17
Issue number29
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jul 2016

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

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