General rules and the normative dimension of belief in Hume's epistemology

Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

Abstract

The main concern of this paper is whether Hume's account of belief has a normative dimension, especially concerning his account of general rules of reasoning in his Treatise of Human Nature, and consequently, whether it is possible to offer an account of the normative force of those rules in spite of his naturalist framework. I conclude that there are many normative elements in his conception of belief and reasoning, and that, as many authors in recent studies of normativity have suggested, naturalism can sufficiently account for the normative structures of our cognition and their normative authority. Such a view of the normative dimension of belief in Hume's epistemology also shows an interesting and close connection with the moral dimension of his thought, which I believe is of fundamental importance for understanding his thought in general.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)283-290
Number of pages8
JournalFilosofia Unisinos
Volume17
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Sep 2016

Keywords

  • Belief
  • General rules
  • Hume
  • Normativity

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'General rules and the normative dimension of belief in Hume's epistemology'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Cite this