Falacia naturalista y razón teorética. Una aproximación sistemática al problema del "deber ser" en David Hume

Translated title of the contribution: Naturalistic fllacy and theoretical reason. a systematic approach to the problem of normativity in Hume's thought

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

This article explores a refreshing interpretation of the "isought- pasage" in Hume's third book of the Treatise. Such interpretation heavily relies on pondering the consequences that the argument would imply for Hume's epistemology. Indeed, the traditional interpretation of the passage involves relevant inconsistencies both in Hume's practical and theoretical philosophy, since at both stages it becomes necessary to account for Hume's normative claims and their importance. The interpretation advanced in this writing supports the idea that the "is-ought passage" is far from denying the possibility of deriving normative claims from facts, but rather that it sets constrains on the way in which such derivation is conceivable.

Translated title of the contributionNaturalistic fllacy and theoretical reason. a systematic approach to the problem of normativity in Hume's thought
Original languageSpanish
Pages (from-to)181-212
Number of pages32
JournalRevista de Humanidades
Volume33
Publication statusPublished - 2016

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Arts and Humanities(all)

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Naturalistic fllacy and theoretical reason. a systematic approach to the problem of normativity in Hume's thought'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this